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Abstract 
Jordan Salmon 
Anthony F. Lucas 
Jim Kilby 
Michael C. Dalbor 
Casino executives were polled regarding their discounting practices and policies. 
The results indicated that casinos offering discounts to players were most concerned 
with a player's actual loss and least concerned about the number of hands/rounds played 
and the player's average bet. The extant literature clearly demonstrates that such a focus 
can result in substantial financial consequences (Lucas, Kilby & Santos, 2003; Kilby, 
Fox & Lucas, 2004). Additionally, the analysis of two discount-oriented deals offered to 
premium players demonstrates the potentially destructive power of discounts on casino 
cash flows. These results fill a gap in the literature related to the prevalence of discounts 
and the extent of casino managements' knowledge of discount mechanics. 
Key Words: discounts on loss, rebates on loss, casino marketing incentives, table 
games management, casino management, price promotion 
Introduction 
The general purpose of this research was to learn more about the practice of 
discounting gambling losses incurred by premium table game players (a.k.a. high-
rollers). Specifically, this exploratory study sought to gain an understanding of how well 
industry practitioners understand the mathematically complex process of discounting. 
For example, which factors do they consider when structuring a discount offer? Are 
these the factors that are crucial to successful deal making? What are the consequences 
of not understanding this process? To these ends, it was necessary to poll casino 
executives as to their discounting policies and practices. Additionally, analyses of actual 
discount deals that were offered to premium players provided an alternative means to the 
same ends. 
Previous researchers have found fault with alleged discounting policies and 
practices (Binkley, 2001; Lucas, Kilby & Santos (2002), but no existing study has 
endeavored to survey casino executives, regarding these procedures. That is, discount 
policy has been critiqued, based solely on the admission of the general practice and the 
experiences of the researchers. No detailed information has been collected from casino 
executives regarding actual policies and procedures. However, discounting the losses of 
high-rollers is a topic that many casino executives are not willing to freely discuss. 
Hence, this study offers rare insight into the high-end deal making processes of the 
casino industry. 
Discounting player losses is a practice that no executive would want to advertise, as 
it clearly reduces cash flows. However, increased competition for premium players has 
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increased the frequency and attractiveness of discount deals, for several reasons. First, 
the gaming industry has experienced considerable expansion over the last 20 years, both 
domestically and internationally. In turn, competition for players has increased with the 
addition of these new properties. Second, mega-markets such as Las Vegas have matured 
and no longer enjoy the favorable supply-demand relationship of past years (Roehl, 
1996). Lastly, there are those that believe the premium player market to be inherently 
profitable, a position based on historical conditions that featured a maximum cost 
exposure of room, food and beverage (RFB) expense (Lucas, Kilby & Santos, 2002). 
Subscribers to this theory will go to great lengths to acquire players they believe to be of 
substantial value. 
The mainstream marketing literature cites increased sales volume as one of the most 
common results of price-based promotions (Blattberg, Briesch & Fox, 1995). However, 
the production of casino revenues differs from traditional business forms due to the 
random effects of probability on short-term gaming activity. This abstract phenomenon 
often leads gaming executives to believe they have 
increased the casino's wealth by the amount of a specific 
player's loss. Of course this is rarely true, as players almost 
always win or lose more than the casino's theoretical win 
(t-win). T-win is the product of a player's total wagers 
multiplied by the house's statistical advantage on those 
wagers. The true value of a player is determined by t-win, 
not his or her actual losses. Hence, incentives based on 
actual player losses should not be casually managed. Only 
those executives with a deep understanding of the complex 
and abstract matters of probability are qualified to define 
the terms of these incentives. 
Incentives based on actual player 
losses should not be casually 
managed. Only those executives 
with a deep understanding of the 
complex and abstract matters of 
probability are qualified to define 
the terms of these incentives. 
Due to mounting competitive pressures, many casino executives have found 
themselves attempting to out-bid each other by offering ever-increasing discount offers 
to premium players. Again, without a keen understanding of the mathematical 
underpinnings, discounting can lead to negative cash flows (Lucas, Kilby & Santos, 
2002; Kilby & Fox, 1998). Deal-making mistakes carry substantial financial 
consequences that can extend well into the future. If unchecked, the effect of these 
negative or marginal cash flow deals can be obscured or partially offset/masked by the 
success of other profit centers such as slots or hotel operations. 
Literature Review 
This review contains four sections. First, two studies on the basics of the 
discounting process are reviewed. Second, research related to the overall effectiveness 
of casino promotions and casino marketing is discussed. Third, literature related to the 
specific practice of discounting is reviewed. And finally, the research objectives are 
summarized. 
Discount Basics 
This section is a summary of Lucas, Kilby and Santos (2002) and Kilby, Fox and 
Lucas (2004). Simply put, these studies showed that a discount reduces the casino's 
statistical advantage. In nearly all cases, the house advantage is decreased by an amount 
greater than the face value of the discount. Alternatively stated, a 10% discount nearly 
always reduces the house advantage by more than 10%. Hence, the casino will refund 
more than 10% of its theoretical win. In general, as the number of hands played 
increases, the gap between a player's actual outcome and the casino's theoretical win 
decreases. When offering a discount, one must be clear regarding the relationship 
between the magnitude of the discount and the requirements of the wagering process. 
That is, the greater the number of hands played, the greater the discount. 
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I Also, the player's bet spread must be monitored. Bet spread is the difference, expressed in units, between the least and greatest wager. Although the bet spread affects the cost of the discount, players sometimes vary their wagers beyond the agreed-upon terms of the deal. Bet tracking allows management to "police" the deal. That is, cancel or revise the discount terms, once the original bet spread 
parameter is breached. Casino executives must be willing to void The greater the number of hands 
played, the greater the discount. or revise the original deal, as the player's betting behavior can 
substantially alter the magnitude of his or her discount. For 
example, 50% of Player A's wagers are $999, with the remaining 
wagers equal to $1, but Player B always wagers $500. Despite the differences in 
wagering patterns, both Player A and Player B produce an average bet of $500, but the 
cost of a fixed-term discount to Player A will be greater. The erratic betting pattern 
(player A's 9:1 bet spread) increases the cost of the discount by increasing the variance 
in the outcome distribution. That is, the likelihood of extreme outcomes is increased. 
When those extreme outcomes are player losses, the house reduces/discounts them by a 
fixed percentage. But when the extreme outcomes result in player wins, no money is 
refunded to the casino. 
Casino executives must bet track to accurately refund a prescribed percentage of a 
player's actual loss. Bet tracking is recording the amount and placement of each wager 
made by the player receiving the discount. For example, player X made a $10,000 bet on 
the banker, in baccarat. Without bet tracking, neither actual loss nor the true house 
advantage can be determined. When executives offer discounts without bet tracking, 
they do not know the player's actual winlloss or the house advantage on the wagers 
placed. It is easy to see how negative cash flow deals could occur under these 
conditions. 
Desperation for premium players and a lack of understanding are competing 
theories for the reluctance of casino executives to include constraints in discount offers. 
The more latitude the player is afforded regarding the number of decisions (e.g., rounds 
played), bet placement and bet spread, the more variance he or she can create in the 
outcome distribution. A lack of discount deal constraints transfers cost control to the 
player. When discounts are involved, high-limit action cannot always be expected to 
lead to profits. 
Casino Promotions 
Much of what is written about the effect of casino promotions/marketing on gaming 
business volumes is anecdotal. Many of these articles appear to be sales pitches, written 
by those responsible for the featured promotion. Unfortunately, the majority of 
published empirical research is characterized by findings suggesting that casino 
promotions, generally, are failing to produce positive cash flows. 
The attempts to increase casino cash flows, via slot promotion, for example, have 
only intermittently succeeded. One study of the ever-popular drawing-based promotion 
produced evidence suggesting the generation of negative cash flows (Lucas & Bowen, 
2002). In most cases, the cash prizes significantly increased coin-in levels, but failed to 
produce incremental revenues beyond the cost of the incentives. Other researchers have 
produced similar results when attempting to measure the effects of cash mail programs 
on slot volume (Lucas & Brewer, 2001; Lucas, Dunn & Singh, 2004). 
Cash mail programs are attempts to employ direct marketing practices featuring 
buy-in incentives. For example, a customer receiving such an offer would receive 
$25.00 in coin or credits for a $20.00 buy-in, producing a $5.00 premium to the player. 
However, Lucas and Brewer (2001) produced results suggesting a cash mail program 
had produced negative cash flows, despite the significant increases in daily coin-in 
associated with the program variable. Lucas, Dunn and Singh (2004) produced similar 
results in their analysis of direct mail incentives offered by a Las Vegas Strip casino. 
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To the contrary, a Midwestern riverboat was found to produce positive cash flows 
from cash mail offers to slot players (Lucas & Santos, 2003), while Lucas & Brewer 
(2001) found slot tournaments to produce positive cash flows for a Las Vegas casino. It 
may not be the type of promotion that is crucial for success, but rather the execution, 
timeliness and appropriateness of the promotion for the property and market. 
With regard to table games promotions, Lucas and Kilby (2002) advanced a 
theoretical model to estimate the effectiveness of match-play coupons on table game 
business volume. This model was empirically tested by Lucas (in press) only to find 
more evidence of negative cash flows. The match-play variable failed to produce a 
significant and positive effect on the cash drop levels of a Las Vegas casino. No other 
studies were found that measured the effect of casino promotions on actual casino 
business volumes. But these findings clearly establish the possibility of less than 
profitable promotional activities within the casino industry. 
Discounting 
Objective research specifically related to the practice of discounting is less 
abundant. Lucas, Kilby and Santos (2002), discuss discounting practices and failures, 
making recommendations to improve existing policies. Binkley's 2001 Wall Street 
Journal article also reports on the ill effects of discounting practices on casino cash 
flows. But neither of these two pieces focuses on the intricacies of actual discounting 
policies. Both articles elude to the widespread use of these play incentives, but offer 
little, in terms of recoverable evidence to support the claim. Until this study, no 
researcher has attempted to profile discounting policy by polling casino executives, who 
are understandably hesitant to discuss these practices. It is not in their financial interest 
to advertise discounts and their credibility has been attacked in the existing literature on 
this topic (Binkley, 2001; Lucas, Kilby & Santos, 2002). 
There seems to be no argument that play incentives and extravagant amenities are 
necessary to attract premium table game players (Roehl, 1996; Eadington & Kent-
Lemon, 1992). Binkley (2001) also includes commentary from Las Vegas casino 
executives in support of this premise. With regard to incentives, the practice of buying 
the business is spreading to lower price points (less than high rollers) as well. 
Shoemaker & Zemke (2004) have found the promotions and benefits offering of Las 
Vegas locals' market casinos to influence the patronage intentions of area residents. But 
the high-rollers are especially coveted and casino marketers from competing properties 
continually attempt to woo players away from each other, via ever-increasing play 
incentives. Lucas, Kilby and Santos (2002) theorize that the spiraling cost of play 
incentives is due to the belief that the premium play market is inherently profitable. 
They hold that if casino executives understood the true cost of these incentives, many of 
these offers would not be made. 
Research Objectives 
Discount policies have been critiqued by previous researchers based solely on their 
personal experiences (Lucas, Kilby & Santos, 2002; Binkley, 2001). This study seeks to 
obtain self-reported evidence from casino executives, stating that they offer discounts. 
As noted by Kilby, Fox and Lucas (2004) and Lucas, Kilby & Santos (2002), discount 
rates must change as a function of the number of hands the recipient is willing to play. 
Also, the casino must bet track when offering a discount. The second objective of this 
study is to gain an understanding of existing discount policies with regard to these 
issues. Are managers structuring discounts based on these factors or are they simply 
looking at credit lines and actual losses? 
Regarding discounts, researchers have also charged casino executives with 
irresponsible deal making (Binkley, 2001; Lucas, Kilby & Santos, 2002). Along the 
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same lines, research findings have indicated evidence of negative cash flows associated 
with several casino promotions (Lucas, in press; Lucas & Brewer, 2001; Lucas & 
Bowen, 2002). Given the apparent disregard for deal and program analysis, this study 
seeks to analyze actual discount deals. These analyses will produce estimates of 
incremental net cash flows resulting from the deals, providing further insight into the 
deal-making prowess of casino marketers. Overall, the analyses of the deals combined 
with the self-reported policy details will help determine the degree to which casino 
marketers understand the complex effects of discount-related deals. 
Methodology 
Data Collection 
One hundred casino properties were selected for inclusion in this study. Casino City 
Press provides a searchable database of casinos called the Gaming Business Directory 
(GBD) (Gaming Business Directory, 2002). The database was searched for casinos in 
the United States with fifty or more table games. The initial search resulted in ninety-six 
properties, from which contact information was also obtained. Four additional properties 
with thirty-five or more table games were also determined to be suitable for the study. 
Given the number of table games (i.e., 35+ ), it seemed likely that discounts would be 
offered by these properties. With regard to the sampling frame, the number of tables 
operated by the casino had no relevance, other than serving as a proxy for the likelihood 
of catering to premium play. 
The GBD online directory provided information on company executives, including 
their area(s) of responsibility. Once the properties were selected, the GBD database was 
queried for executives whose responsibilities included senior-level marketing. In most 
cases, only one name was listed. When there was more than one individual listed, the 
person with the most senior title was selected as the addressee. The intention was for the 
survey to be completed by a person likely to design, offer, or be directly involved in the 
process of offering discounts to players. 
In general, the questionnaire was designed to gauge the knowledge of casino deal 
makers with regard to the discounting process. However, the questions also addressed 
the gap in the literature related to the prevalence and general understanding of the 
discounting practice. Appendix A contains a copy of the questionnaire used in this study. 
Ultimately, casinos in the GBD with 35+ table games were sent surveys, via the 
U.S. postal service. In an effort to contact non-responders, a follow-up survey was 
mailed with a postage-paid return envelope. This follow-up mailing occurred 40 days 
after the initial mailing. Cover letters were included in both mailings. The follow-up 
cover letter reminded recipients that they had not yet responded. 
Individual Deal Terms 
Additionally, two discount deals offered to separate parties were analyzed using the 
Casino Marketing Manager version 3.3.2. This software is specifically designed to 
compute the change in the house advantage of a casino game, resulting from the terms 
of discounting deals. The terms of these deals were obtained via the consulting practices 
of the authors. Both deals were offered to premium players by Las Vegas casino 
executives. 
Using survey data is one way to assess the broad-based understanding of the 
discounting process, but analysis of actual deals offers another avenue of discovery. 
Taken together, it is hoped that these two approaches will provide a clearer picture of the 
deal making practices of casino executives. The terms of the two deals are listed in 
Tables 1 and 2. 
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Table 1 
Play Summary and Deal Terms: Deall 
Player Rating Data: 
Days of Play 
Marker Play 
Chip Play 
Total Buy-in 
Actual Win/(Loss) 
Average Bet 
Length of Play (hrs:mins) 
T-win 
Games Played Most Often (1) 
Deal Terms/Expenses: 
Notes. 
Non-negotiable Chips 
Total Comps (RFB) 
Discount: 20% of Actual Loss (2) 
Additional Discount (3) 
Travel Discount (4) 
3 
$2,000,000 
$1,310,000 
$3,310,000 
($2,007 ,300) 
$46,315.79 
18:24 
$239,429 
Blackjack 
$75,000 
$85,000 
$401,460 
$115,000 
$25,000 
(1) If other games were played, the true cost of the discount changes. 
(2) This was a 20% a priori discount, i.e., it was agreed upon before any play occurred. 
(3) This was a post hoc deal, where the debt to the casino was reduced by an additional 
lump sum. 
(4) Akin to an airfare incentive 
Table2 
Summary of Deal Terms: Deal 2 
Notes. 
Offer Parameters: 
Maximum Bet ( 1) 
Average Bet (1) 
Commission to Agent (2) 
Credit Line 
Airfare Allowance (3) 
Promo Chips 
Game: Baccarat 
Discount Schedule: (4) 
$0- $1M loss= 15% 
$1M- $3M loss= 20% 
$3M+ loss= 25% 
$100,000 
$60,000 
$150,000 
$5,000,000 
$150,000 
$150,000 
(1) Although the player is permitted to wager $lOOk, his average bet over the course of 
play must be no more than $60k. 
(2) A commission paid to the player's agent, if at least 12 shoes are played or the player 
loses at least $3M. 
(3) Although a cash airfare allowance was part of the offer, the deal also included 
round-trip transportation on the casino's private jet. In reality, the airfare allowance 
is simply a cash payment to the player for patronizing the casino. 
( 4) This tiered discount structure is very popular with casinos. 
(5) The player was also offered full RFB status. 
(6) After 12 shoes are completed, the deal resets. That is, all play incentives are paid 
again, as if it were a new trip. 
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Deal 1 (Table 1) includes both deal terms and actual results from gambling activity. 
The first section of Table 1 provides the details related to revenue production, including 
the game played and the duration of play. These data all originated from actual player 
rating cards which were entered into the casino system. The most important line item in 
this section is the theoretical win (t-win). Also included in Table 1 are the expenses 
associated with Deal 1. According to the terms of the deal, the player was to receive a 
20% a priori discount, which amounted to $401,460. However, due to the magnitude of 
the player's actual loss, an additional post hoc discount of $115,000 was awarded. 
Deal 2 (Table 2) only includes the offer terms/constraints. However, these terms 
reset after 12 shoes of baccarat are dealt (about 960 hands). That is, all play incentives 
are paid again, as if it were a new gambling visit or trip: This includes a reset for the 
discount terms as well. As indicated in Table 2, the player could wager as much as 
$100,000 per round, but the average bet over a 12-shoe period could not exceed 
$60,000. Deal 2 featured a tiered discount structure wherein the rebate percentage varied 
based on the player's actual loss. The discount rate ranged from 15% to 25%. 
Once the incremental win (revenue) from these deals was computed, the associated 
expenses were considered. These expenses ranged from agent commissions to travel 
reimbursement. A complete listing of the associated expenses for each deal can be found 
in the Results section. Given the revenue focus of casino marketers, this incremental 
cash flow analysis is necessary to demonstrate the bottom-line effect of reducing the 
house advantage within an expense-heavy deal structure. The results of the deal analyses 
will demonstrate the ultimate effects of actual discount-driven play incentives. 
Results 
Table 3 lists responses to the survey items related to discount determination factors. 
For the purposes of anonymity, the results are listed by each property's identification 
code. Thirty surveys were returned, but only 14 casinos reported the use of discounts. 
The data in Table 3 pertains to these 14 casino properties. 
Table3 
Response Summary for Casinos Reporting the Use of Discounts 
Discount Determination Factors 
Min. #of 
Casino Credit Credit Avg. Hands Min. Actual 
ID Line Line(l) Bet (2) Played (3) Loss (4) 
K27 Yes $150,000 No No $150,000 
K19 No $0 No No $50,000 
K32 Yes $50,000 Yes Yes $50,000 
J7 Yes $50,000 No No $50,000 
K41 No $0 No No $100,000 
E2 No $0 No No $0 
K38 Yes $0 No Yes $100,000 
K42 Yes $150,000 No No $150,000 
K33 No $0 No No $0 
K17 No $0 No No $0 
K7 Yes $50,000 No Yes $50,000 
J8 No $0 Yes Yes $100,000 
K23 No $0 No No $100,000 
B1 No $0 No No $100,000 
Notes. 
(1) Minimum credit line for a player to be eligible for a discount. 
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(2) Only one property reported a minimum average bet constraint of $800, as a matter 
of policy. 
(3) No property reported the use of a minimum hands requirement associated with 
process of awarding a discount. 
(4) This amount represents a minimum loss by the player to become eligible for a 
discount. 
Only two of 14 respondents were concerned with average bets. And only four of 14 
respondents considered the number of hands played. Table 3 clearly indicates that the 
player's actual loss was the most important factor related to the discount process. 
Although not shown in Table 3, seven of 14 reporting properties claimed to record the 
amount and nature of each bet placed by players receiving discounts. Three of the seven 
respondents that reported the use of bet tracking noted that this practice was intermittent. 
In summary, average bet and number of hands played were not crucial to the process, 
while the player's actual loss appeared to be paramount. Additionally, bet tracking 
seemed to be of moderate importance. 
Table 4 contains results from the same 14 properties described in Table 3. Here the 
respondents were asked to weight the importance of four discount determinants. Table 4 
summarizes their responses. 
Table4 
Response Summary: Importance Ranking of Discount Determinants 
Importance Weight (in %) 
Credit Average #of Hands Actual 
Casino ID Line Bet Played Played Loss 
K27 0 0 0 100 
K19 0 0 0 100 
K32 20 10 10 60 
J7 0 0 0 100 
K41 0 0 0 100 
E2 25 0 0 75 
K38 0 0 0 100 
K42 0 0 0 100 
K33 0 0 0 0 
K17 0 0 0 100 
K7 50 0 25 25 
J8 0 10 0 90 
K23 0 0 0 100 
B1 0 0 0 100 
These results corroborate those found in Table 3. All but one property (K7) listed 
actual loss as the primary discount criterion. K7 gave credit line the heaviest weight 
(50%), well above average bet (0%) and number of hands played (25% ). Without 
exception, these latter variables received weights that indicated low importance. The 
mode weight for both average bet and number of hands played was zero (12 out of 14 
cases). It should be noted that one property (K33) failed to report any weights. 
Table 5 analyzes Deal1, which is described in Table 1. Certain assumptions were 
made regarding the player's skill level, as the true house advantage was not known. 
Blackjack is a game of skill, making the house advantage a function of the game rules 
and the player's blackjack ability. 
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TableS 
Analysis of Deall 
Notes 
Assumptions: 
House Advantage Before Discount (1) 
Bet Spread (2) 
Hands per Hour (3) 
Results: 
T-win Before Discount (4) 
T-win After Discount (5) 
Less: 
Additional Discount (6) 
RFB Expense (7) 
Gaming Tax (8) 
Non-negotiable Chip Cost (9) 
Profit (10) 
0.42% 
1:4 
210 
$755,916 
$364,425 
$115,000 
$85,246 
$24,599 
$79.393 
$60,187 
(1) Computed by Casino Marketing Manager software (v. 3.3.2). Assumes a 6-deck 
shoe, dealer stands on soft 17, and player can double after split. 
(2) The software computes all possible outcomes of wagering activity assuming a 1:4 
bet spread. This assumes 50% of the bets are 1-unit wagers and 50% are 4-units 
wagers. A constant wager is likely to underestimate the outcome distribution 
variance. 
(3) 210 hands per hour is the estimated game speed for one-on-one play (Kilby, Fox & 
Lucas, 2004). The casino system errantly estimated the hands per hour at 67, 
assuming a full table. 
(4) (Avg. bet)(House adv.)(Hands per hour)(Hours played). Slight differences may arise 
from rounding decisions. 
(5) The expected win, after the effect of the 20% discount. The standard deviation of 
the associated outcome distribution exceeds $2M. This is no small concern, if 
outcome volatility is a concern (i.e., cash flow volatility is an issue). 
(6) As this amount is not expressed in a priori terms, it is treated like a cash award. 
(7) RFB expense may be reduced by amounts equal to the difference between actual 
cost and retail/complimentary room rates. Other cost reductions may be available 
for food and beverage charges occurring in casino-operated outlets. 
(8) 6,75% of t-win after the discount, i.e., (0.675)(364,425). Nevada's Gaming Control 
Board treats discounts as a business expense, making the reduced t-win the 
appropriate tax basis. In Las Vegas other local taxes would be owed as well (i.e., 
0.5%). 
(9) See Kilby & Fox ( 1998) for more on computing the cost of non-negotiable chips. 
This analysis assumes a house edge of 0.42% and a 6.75% gaming tax paid on t-win 
generated from chip wash. 
(10)T-win after the 20% discount (i.e., $364,425) less associated expenses. 
In this case, the player's value to the casino is nowhere near the $2M actual loss or 
the $755k t-win, before the discount and expenses. Although the expected value of the 
after-discount t-win was $364,425, the standard deviation ofthat outcome distribution 
exceeded $2M. This is a tremendous amount of cash flow risk for a $60,187 profit. Most 
casinos are not in a position to entertain intermittent play of this magnitude, as the cash 
flow variance is capable of destroying quarterly earnings. 
In analyzing deal1, it was interesting to discover that the casino system assumed 
the player to be wagering on a nearly full table. The following formula was the basis of 
this conclusion. 
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(System t-win) I (House adv.) I (Avg. bet) I (Hours played)= Hands per hour, or 
$239,429 I 0.0042 I 46,315.79 I 18.5 hours= 67 hands per hour 
A player with an average bet of this magnitude is almost always playing one-on-one 
(or head-to-head). That is, only the player and the dealer are on the game. Because of 
this condition, the hands per hour estimate increases from 65 to 210 (See Kilby, Fox & 
Lucas, 2004 ). This underestimation of premium player t-win is very common. In fact, if 
the system theoretical of $239,429 were used in our analysis ofDeal1, a substantial 
negative cash flow would result. Based on the information available to management, the 
deal should not have been offered to the player. 
Table 6 analyzes Deal 2, as described in Table 2. Again it was necessary to make 
some assumptions regarding betting strategy. However this analysis was less sensitive to 
such assumptions, as this player's game was baccarat. In baccarat the player-side and 
banker-side bets have nearly the same house advantage, at 1.24% and 1.06%, 
respectively. Tie bets are rarely made by player's of this caliber. Despite the wagering 
strategy, the bet tracking process would record all actual wagers, allowing for a precise 
house advantage to be determined. But this deal must be analyzed before it is offered to 
the player, creating the need for house advantage assumptions. 
Table6 
Analysis of Deal 2: Mter 12 Shoes of Baccarat 
Notes 
Revenues: 
T-win with no discount (1) 
T-win after discount (2) 
Less Expenses: 
Commission to Agent (3) 
Airfare Allowance ( 4) 
Promo Chip Allowance (5) 
Air/Travel Expense (6) 
RFB (7) 
Deal Profit: 
Profit/(Loss) after 12 shoes (8) 
$594,121 
351,900 
$150,000 
150,000 
155,691 
10,000 
15,000 
($128,791) 
(1) Assumes 78 hands per shoe, a house edge of 1.06%, 12 shoes played, and an 
average bet of $60,000. By truncating the house advantage to two places, rounding 
differences from system estimates occurred. 
(2) T-win after adjusting for the tiered discount terms (See Table 2). 
(3) This commission is part of the deal terms. It is to be paid to the player's agent. 
(4) Ostensibly for airfare reimbursement, this incentive has evolved into another cash 
bonus. 
(5) See Kilby & Fox (1998) for more on computing the cost of non-negotiable chips. 
Assumes a house edge of 0.42% and a 6. 75% gaming tax paid on t-win generated 
from chip wash. In Las Vegas an additional 0.5% tax on gaming win would be paid. 
(6) This expense was estimated based the industry experience of the authors. It 
represents the per-trip cost of operating a company aircraft. This estimate is 
conservative. 
(7) This expense represents the cost of full RFB privileges for the player, his agent, and 
any entourage, over a 3-day period. This is a conservative estimate. 
(8) T-win after discount less all deal costs. 
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This deal is expected to produce negative cash flow. Management should not have 
extended these terms. It was a business decision based on either a poor or insufficient 
analysis. The Casino Marketing Manager software, or something like it, is necessary to 
accurately estimate the after-discount t-win of an offer such as this one. The software 
computes all possible outcomes, creating a weighted average discount. That is, it is quite 
capable of analyzing the tiered discount structure of this offer. 
Again, Deal 2 should have never been offered to the player, under any 
circumstances. The player's agent was an effective negotiator. Worse yet, Deal2 offers 
reset terms, allowing the player to invoke the terms multiple times. As analyzed, this 
offer also produced an outcome distribution with a standard deviation of $2M, making it 
an inherently dangerous proposition for most casinos. 
Disscussion 
Others have cited irresponsible deal making practices, with regard to discounts 
offered to players (Binkley, 2001; Lucas Kilby & Santos, 2002). The results of this study 
support these claims. Despite the fact that only 14 casinos offered discounts, all of them 
are paying attention to the wrong variables, clearly demonstrating a lack of knowledge 
in a crucial area. 
Further, the authors have analyzed deals for some of the 
As discounts change the house casinos that denied the use of discounts. In the experience of 
advantage of any game one must the authors, nearly all casinos that cater to a premium play 
• • ' clientele offer discounts. But, as previously mentioned, this is 
pay stnct attention to the dollar- not a topic that casino executives are willing to discuss. In 
amount of the wagers placed. summary, the authors believe that the number of casinos 
offering discounts was severely under-reported. 
As discounts change the house advantage of any game, one must pay strict attention 
to the dollar-amount of the wagers placed and the number of wagers placed (Lucas, 
Kilby & Santos, 2002; Kilby, Fox & Lucas, 2004). With seven of 14 properties claiming 
to bet track, 50% ofthe casinos don't know the house advantage associated with the 
deal/game. Of course this assumes the house still has an advantage, which is a 
dangerous assumption. Worse yet, three of the casinos claiming to bet track, do so only 
intermittently. Bet tracking is labor intensive and may seem unnecessary to these 
executives, as the results indicate that they are chiefly concerned with actual losses. 
Discounts decrease the house advantage whether players win or lose (Lucas, Kilby 
& Santos, 2002). The house advantage is needed to compute a player's theoretical win, 
which, in turn, serves as the basis for complimentary awards such as the player's room, 
food and beverage (RFB) expenses. However, when RFB awards are computed using 
the original game advantage instead of the reduced advantage, the effect of this discount 
is increased. After these and other play incentives are considered, there is very little, if 
anything left for the casino. The effects of discounts are not obvious, but casino 
executives must strive to understand this process, as it affects the players placing the 
greatest wagers. For more on the mathematics of discounts, see Kilby, Fox and Lucas 
(2004). 
Deals 1 and 2 
With regard to Deall, a 20% a priori discount reduced the house advantage by 
52%, while Deal2's tiered discount can be expected to reduce the house edge by 41%. 
The change in the house edge is equal to the change in the t-win, from the before-
discount level. In general, profits are cut in half, before the effects of all the other 
incentives such as promotional chips, airfare, and agent commissions. What business 
can afford that kind of volume discount? 
In the case of Deal 2, no business can afford deals that produce negative cash flows. 
However, Deal 1 generated positive cash flows. But the profit on this deal was miniscule 
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compared to the cash flow risk (i.e., the $2M standard deviation) and the capital 
invested in assets necessary to attract these players. Management should consider cash 
flows generated by or related to the assets required to produce them. 
The results of the Deal 1 and Deal 2 analyses further demonstrate a lack of 
knowledge regarding the mechanics of discounts. This condition may limit the ability of 
management to accurately compare cash flows produced by premium players to the net 
asset base (for premium play amenities). That is, if one cannot compute one's true cash 
flow, one cannot compute return on net assets. Given that all the discount-granting 
properties in this study pay the most attention to actual loss, it is likely that most of 
those executives believe the house to have won $2M+ from the Deal 1 action. Even if 
the casino reduced the $2M loss by the sum of the discount amount and play incentives, 
positive cash flows would still be grossly overstated for purposes of player valuation. 
When play incentives are communicated in terms of a player's actual loss, with no 
regard for the number of hands/rounds played, red flags should appear in the minds of 
analysts. The very couching of the offer indicates management's misunderstanding of 
the process. However, even if discounts were communicated as percentage rebates oft-
win, bet tracking would still be necessary. But bet tracking is unpopular, as it is a labor 
intensive process. Given the evidence presented in the existing literature, many casino 
executives would be disappointed by the cash flows produced by this allegedly high-
profit segment, known as the high-roller business. 
Discount Policy Flaws 
One of the most deceiving characteristics of a discount is that a 10% rebate of a 
player's actual loss almost always results in a much greater percentage decrease in t-
win. Previous researchers have shown that the discount reduces the house advantage of 
the game, whether the player wins or loses (Lucas, Kilby & 
Santos, 2002). This abstract play incentive is difficult to 
understand, but much more costly than it appears. The terms of 
the game change at the level of the expected value formula. 
To avoid future miscues, casino executives are encouraged 
to use the available resources such as discount analysis software 
and the growing literature base. However, the authors realize that 
paradigms are not easily diminished. For example, gaming 
executives approach the premium player market with the goal of 
winning the player's bankroll. It sounds innocent enough, but it 
leads to a focus on actual wins and losses at the player level, 
ignoring the normal variance of the outcome distribution. 
Players of unfair games (games with a house advantage) will 
To avoid future miscues, 
casino executives are 
encouraged to use the 
available resources such as 
discount analysis software 
and the growing literature 
base. 
lose in the long run. However, in the short-term, some may appear to be brilliant while 
others may appear cursed or even ignorant. But the truth always equals the product of 
the amount wagered and the house advantage. Casino executives must ignore actual 
wins/losses when valuing players. Casino executives should not concern themselves 
with determining who they can beat; they should concentrate on attracting customers to 
the games. If this requires play incentives, deals should be structured in such a way that 
they produce an acceptable profit for the risk endured. See Kilby, Fox and Lucas (2004) 
for more on how to properly structure discounts. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Although this work is the only study of its kind, the lack of response to the survey 
leaves much to learn about the specific discounting policies of casinos. However the 
responders were true to form, supporting the claims of existing researchers. Other 
survey efforts might include a hypothetical scenario, detailing the results of premium 
player's trip(s). Given this information, respondents would be asked to describe the 
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discount, if any, this player would receive. An actual loss of $50,000 is recommended 
for use in this capacity, as it is great enough to trigger a discount by most properties. 
Further, many casinos have players capable of losing $50,000, preventing a low 
response rate due to item design exclusion. 
Through this hypothetical question format, variables such as the number of hands 
played could be isolated and manipulated. These questions would demonstrate whether 
the responders understand the role of each variable in the discount process. As casinos 
executives are reluctant to discuss discounting practices, only repeated attempts to 
gather information on this phenomenon will help researchers describe the discounting 
practices. No one study is likely to contain data from 75 casinos. 
Other important issues deserving more attention are bet tracking policies and 
general discount theory. Specifically, questions aimed at the value of discounts to 
players. For example, does a 10% discount reduce the house advantage by 10%? Bet 
tracking questions might also focus on general theory. For instance, is bet tracking 
necessary to determine the true cost of a discount? Responses to these types of questions 
would be most telling. 
Finally, some attempt should be made to measure the industry's level of awareness 
regarding the effect of bet spread on a priori discount agreements. For example, what 
constraints are in place to keep the players from wagering one unit on some bets and 10 
units on other bets? As erratic betting increases the cost of discounts by increasing 
outcome variance, casino executives must limit bet spreads. When estimating the cost of 
a discount, specific language must be used regarding average bet parameters. For 
example, 50 one-unit wagers and 50 ten-unit wagers do not constitute an average bet of 
5.5 units, when estimating the cost of a discount. This erratic bet pattern is characterized 
by a ten-unit bet spread. All else held constant, flat bettors produce outcome 
distributions with less variance than erratic bettors with the same simple average bet. As 
this is a somewhat abstract concept, it would be interesting to measure the degree to 
which it is understood by industry executives. 
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Appendix A 
Discount on Loss Survey 
1. Do you offer discounts on loss to your customers as a promotional tool? 
Yes ___ _ No ___ _ 
2. Is a standard discount as a percentage of loss offered to players? 
Yes ___ _ No ___ _ 
3. Does the discount offered vary upon the customer's credit line? 
Yes ___ _ No ___ _ 
4. Does the discount offered vary upon the customer's average bet? 
Yes ___ _ No ___ _ 
5. Does the discount offered vary upon the number of hands (spins/shoes) a customer 
plays? 
Yes ___ _ No ___ _ 
6. Does the discount offered vary upon the actual loss of a customer? 
Yes ___ _ No ___ _ 
7. Please attach a weight that each factor contributes to the amount of discount 
offered. 
Credit Line 
Average Bet 
#of Hands 
Actual Loss 
TotallOO% 
8. Do you ever change a predetermined discount based upon the actual amount lost 
by the player? 
Yes. ___ _ No ___ _ 
9. Do you ever change a predetermined discount based upon the time it takes for a 
player to lose (quick loss provision)? 
Yes ___ _ No ___ _ 
10. Do you utilize bet tracking for customers receiving a discount? 
Yes ___ _ No ___ _ 
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